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Retirement Planning for Dictators: What Happens to
Outgoing Dictators?∗
Seiki Tanaka†
Abstract
Whathappens toautocratic leaderswhoholdcompetitiveelections?Autocratsgaina
keybenefitbyholdingcompetitiveelections:abetterpost-tenurefate.Accord-ingtomy
argument, autocrats who introduce competitive elections receive implicit or explicit
assurancesthattheywillbeabletoleaveofficeandretirepeacefully.Bycontrast,failing
to hold a competitive election is more likely to result in a violent re-moval such as
execution,prosecution,and/or foreign intervention.Thepaper tests theargumentby
analyzingacross-nationaldatasetofautocrats’fatesbetween1960-2004,andtheresults
provideevidencethatautocraticleaderswhoholdcompetitiveelectionsaremorelikely
tolosepowerpeacefully,andtheresultholdsregardlessofregimetypes.
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1 Introduction
The introduction ofpolitical institutions such asmultiparty elections, politicalparties,
legislatures,andconstitutionsmaynotbejust“window-dressing”forautocraticleaders. In-
stead, implementing such reforms, someargue,helpsautocrats retainpower,because they
appear to increase legitimacy,placate citizens, and satisfymembers of the opposition (Al-
bertusandMenaldo2012;Blaydes2011;BoixandSvolik2013;Gandhi2008;Gandhiand
Kim2010;GandhiandLust-Okar2009;GandhiandPrzeworski2006;2007;Lust-Okar2006;
Magaloni 2006; Wright 2008).1 While many scholars have attempted to illuminate what
happenstoautocraticregimesaftertheintroductionofsuchpoliticalinstitutions,whathap-
penstoautocratic leaderswhoapprovetheiradoptionremainsmurky.Thispaperexamines
leaders’ fatesby focusingononedemocratic institution -competitiveelections,definedasa
contestwithat leasttwocandidatesontheballot-andaskswhathappenstodictatorswho
holdacompetitiveelection.2
Forsomeautocrats, introducingacompetitiveelection isagamble.InthePhilippines in
1986,Nicaraguain1990,Zambiain1991,andMadagascarin2001,leaderslostelectionsthat
they introduced,andfailedtoremain inpower.Further,evenforthosewhowinanelection,
theintroductionofcompetitionmayhaveadestabilizingeffectontheregimeandshortenits
duration(Brownlee2007,HowardandRoessler2006,Lindberg2009,Tucker2007).Andthe
risksdonotendwiththeelectionoutcome:afterlosingpowerbetween1946and2004,47%of
dictatorsfaceddireoutcomessuchasimprisonment,killings,execution,andexile(Escriba`-
Folch2013). Yet in spiteof the risks,manyautocratsengage incompetitiveelections: 136
1Therearesomecounter-arguments. See, forexample,WrightandEscriba`-Folch(2012).
2Inthisarticle,competitiveelectionsunderdictatorshipandsemi-competitiveelectionsareusedinter-
changeably.Competitiveelectionsdonotnecessarilymeanthatelectionsarefreeandfair,butinthispaper,a
competitiveelectionhastosatisfyallthreeofthefollowingcriteria:oppositionisallowed;thereismorethan
onelegalpartylegal;andthereisachoiceofcandidatesontheballot.Thecriteriacanbedeterminedbeforean
election,whileevaluatingwhetherelectionswerefreeandfairisdifficultandcanbedoneonlyex-post(Hyde
andMarinov2012).SeealsoDiamond(2002);GandhiandLust-Okar(2009);LevitskyandWay(2002;2010)
andSchedler(2002;2013)abouttheconceptofcompetitiveelections.
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competitiveelectionswereheld inautocraticregimesbetween1960and2004.
Toilluminatewhy,Iextendautocraticleaders’timehorizonstotheperiodfollowingtheir
rule,thepost-tenureperiod,andarguethatwhileautocraticleadersmaynotbeabletosecure
a long tenureby introducing competitive elections, they can secure a safe exit -bywhich I
meanthatautocratscanavoidviolentremovalsuchasprosecution,execution,exile,and/or
foreigninterventionwhentheylosepower.Inotherwords,thepossibilityorguaranteeofpost-
tenurepoliticalsurvival followingcompetitiveelections isasubstantialpay-off forautocrats
whointroducecompetitiveelections.
With thismotivation inmind, I present a theory of how holding competitive elections
leads to better post-tenure fates for autocrats. My central argument is that by holding
competitiveelections,autocratscan receive implicitorexplicitassurancesabout theirpost-
tenure retirement. Implicitly,competitiveelectionsgenerate legitimacy forautocrats,which
makes itmoredifficult forotheractors topunish them than theircounterpartswhodonot
hold competitive elections.Elections have become common practice in theworld, and the
internationalcommunityanddomesticmovementsalikedemandthatautocratsholdelections
(Staniland 2014). Accordingly, if an autocrat concedes and holds a competitive election,
domesticactorswillfind itmoredifficult topunishhimand internationalactorswill facea
disincentive to do so, to avoid deterring others from holding elections. As a result, the
autocratwho implements a competitive electionwill face fewer threats to a peaceful post-
tenure fate. Autocrats can also hold a competitive election in exchange for an explicit
reassurancethathecanretirepeacefully,intheformofimmunityfromprosecutionoranew
politicalposition.Theimplicationsofbothimplicitandexplicitreassurancearethatautocrats
whoholdcompetitiveelectionsshouldbemorelikelytoenjoyasaferetirement.
Using cross-nationaldata on elections and autocrats’post-tenure fates, I test the argu-
ment. Estimating the effect of competitive elections on autocrats’ post-tenure fates is not
straightforward,becausethereisaconcernthatthosewhointroducecompetitiveelections
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are systematically different from thosewho do not, and the elections adopters are already
morelikelytoenjoyapeacefulexit.Toaddresstheseconcerns,theempiricalanalysesestimate
theimpactofcompetitiveelectionsonautocrats’post-electionfateswhileholdingobservables
constant, and rely on entropy balancing to adjust imbalances in covariates (Hain-mueller
2012). In other words, this paper estimates whether the “treatment” (i.e., holding a
competitiveelection)providesabetterpost-tenure fatethanthe“control”(i.e.,notholding
suchanelection).Theanalysesshowthatautocratic leaderswhoholdcompetitiveelections
haveabetterpost-tenurefatethanthosewhodonot.
Other work such as Cox (2009) and Escriba`-Folch (2013) broadly examine autocratic
leaders and track outgoing leaders in transition. However, by focusing on the impact of
competitiveelectionsonpost-tenurefatesofautocraticleadersandemployingamorerigorous
inference strategy, this paper shows that competitive elections enable autocrats to secure
betterpost-tenure fates.Thisfindingholds regardlessof regime type.While regimeswitha
politicalpartysystemmaybe less likelytopunishautocrats(Cox2009;Geddesetal.2014;
Escriba`-Folch2013),thispapershowsthatholdingcompetitiveelectionscanhelpautocrats
improve their post-tenure fates even in regimeswithout political parties: compared to not
holding competitive elections, competitive elections reduce the likelihood that other actors
willseektopunishtheautocrat.
Thepaperalso suggests that learningabout the fatesofdictatorsprovidesnew insights
intoautocrats’decisionsatcriticalpointswhenpoliticalliberalizationbecomespossible.First,
revealingtheimportanceofex-postpoliticalsurvivalforanautocratmayaffectthelikelihood
ofholdingacompetitiveelection.Though some scholarscontend that the spreadofhuman
rightsnormscouldbecounter-productive forpoliticaldevelopment (e.g.,Escriba`-Folchand
Wright 2012; Mchangama and Verdirame 2013), my argument indicates a more nuanced
association: the threat of international prosecution for human rights violations does not
preventautocratsfromliberalizing;rather,theymaybemorelikelytointroducereforms
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andstepdowninexchangeforimmunity.Further,shiftingtheexplanatoryunittoleadersand
discussing thepossiblepathof leadershipchangeunderautocracycontributes to the recent
literature of regime types (Geddes et al. 2014; Schuler et al. 2013), because holding
competitiveelectionstendstoresult inpolitical liberalization inthe long-term(Howardand
Roessler2006,Lindberg2009).This, in turn, suggests thatofferingbetterpost-tenure fates
aftercompetitiveelectionsmayincreasethechanceofpoliticalliberalization.
Thispaperproceedsasfollows.Thenextsectiondiscussesthe literatureandoutlinesthe
paper’shypothesestoexplainvariationinautocrats’post-tenurefates.Sectionthreeoutlines
my research design, and section four presents the empirical analyses. Finally, section five
concludesbydiscussingpolicyimplicationsandthecontributionsofthepaper.
2 CompetitiveElectionandPost-tenureFates
Thispaperarguesthatholdingcompetitiveelectionsleadstoakeybenefitforautocrats:a
saferretirement.Inmosttheoreticalframeworks,thechoicethatdictatorsfaceiswhetherto
retainpoweror stepdown,and losingoffice results inzeroornegativepayoff (e.g.,Tullock
1987).Following this logic, if competitive elections lead to a shorter tenure and autocrats
eventually losepower(e.g.,HowardandRoessler2006),thentheyhavean incentivetohold
completive electionsonlywhena revolutionary threat is imminent (e.g.,Cox2009;Geddes
2006). However, some scholars suggest that there are important cases in which autocrats
introducecompetitiveelectionsbecausetheyarereassuredabouttheirpost-tenurefates,and
thepayoffassociatedwith losingpower isnon-zero,orpositive (e.g.,Przeworski1988).3On
the other hand, a growing number of former autocratic leaders have faced criminal
prosecutions(Escriba`-FolchandWright2012;KimandSikkink2010).Escriba`-Folchand
3A similar argument has been offered by other scholars (Cox 2009;Gandhi andPrzeworski 2009).Cox
(2009),forinstance,arguesthatautocraticregimesholdcompetitiveelectionsinordertogaininformationthat
wouldreducetheriskofviolentremovalfromofficeviaacoupd’e´tatorrevolution.
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Wright(2012)arguethatprosecutionsofdictators increasethecostof leavingofficedueto
past human rights violations and the possibility of facing prosecution, and contemporary
autocratsare less likelytostepdown.
Iarguethatadictator’sdilemmaisnotthechoicetoretainpowerorstepdown,but: (1)
eithernot tohold a competitive election, retainpower as long aspossible, and eventually
face a “high-risk” exit; or (2) to hold a competitive election and avoid a high-risk exit,
even though it may shorten how long the autocrat retains power. Here, I consider three
exit possibilities as high-risk: exile, prosecution in domestic and international courts, or
execution. In otherwords, I argue that there is a strong association between competitive
electionsandtheavoidanceofsuchhigh-riskexits.
How does holding a competitive election lead to an improved post-tenure fate for au-
tocrats?Schelling(1966)suggeststhatinorderforanautocrattoholdanelection,animplicit
or explicit reassurancehas tobe offered to an autocrat so thathispayoff for losingpower
becomes non-zero. I identify two types of reassurance autocrats can receive through
competitiveelections:(1)legitimacy;and(2)anexplicitpact.
First, competitive elections can generate international and domestic legitimacy for au-
tocrats (Alagappa 1995). Autocrats can secure better post-tenure fates because holding a
competitiveelection increasestheirreputationaspoliticiansandevenafterthey losepower,
they canbe respected as a “good”politicianwho followed the rule of law andheld a com-
petitiveelection. Indeed, since theendof theColdWar,Westerndemocracieshavemade it
clearthattheyprefergovernmentselectedthroughcompetitiveelections(BeaulieuandHyde
2009;MarinovandGoemans2013).4Suchapolicyposturemakes itrelativelymoredifficult
forotheractorstopunishautocratswhoholdcompetitiveelections,becausetheinternational
communitydoesnotwanttodeterotherautocratsfromholdingelections.
4Theirargument isbasedon the existenceof international electionobserversbut it ishighly correlated
withwhetherornotanelection iscompetitive.
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Thislegitimacy-generatingeffectcanhappenevenforunpopulardictators.Forexample,
after10yearsofrepressiverule,byholdingthefirstcompetitiveelectioninadecade,Ghana’s
presidentRawlingsgainedrespectandsteppeddownastheguardianofademocratictran-
sition. Thoughholdingcompetitiveelectionsdoesnotprovideautocratswith immunity for
pastcrimes,Iexpectthatdomesticandinternationalactorsarelesslikelytopunishautocrats
whoholdcompetitiveelections,asopposedtothosewho lackelectoral legitimacy.5
Someautocratsmayfeelinsecureabouttheirretirementplaniftheydonothaveexplicit
reassurances.Withoutathirdpartytoensureasaferetirement,theautocratsmaynottrust
thatholdingacompetitiveelectionwillpayoff(North1990;NorthandWeingast1989;Olsen
1993;Weingast1997). Inthiscase,autocratscanleverageapromiseofelectionsinexchange
for a pact that can provide an explicit reassurance. This type of reassurance typically
includesan immunityclause intheconstitution,apactbetweenbetweenautocratsandthe
opposition,oranewposition inthegovernmentthatsometimes involves lifetime immunity.
Przeworski(1988)callsthesetypesofexplicitpacts“negotiatedtransitionstodemocracy,”
inwhich political institutions protect interests associated with the authoritarian regimes,
andthusminimizetheextentofeventualtransformations.6For instance,RawlingsofGhana
wroteanewconstitutionin1989,twoyearsbeforehisfirstcompetitiveelections,whichgave
membersoftheregime immunity fromdomesticprosecution followingatransition.
Inexchangeforholdingacompetitiveelection,outgoingdictatorscanalsoreceiveanew
position in the government. As a result of negotiationswith the opposition, for example,
5Inaddition to the reputationbenefitsof legitimacy, somecontemporaryautocratshaveaccess tomone-
tary benefits.TheMo IbrahimFoundation, founded by the Sudanese billionaire, givesmulti-million dollar
awards toAfrican leaderswhoare elected tooffice,promotedemocracy,donot steal from thepeople,and
cedepowerpeacefully. TheaimoftheIbrahimPrize isto induceAfrican leaderstoensurethattheydonot
remain inofficebecause they lacka retirementplan. Recipients receivefivemilliondollarsover tenyears,
and a lifetime grant of two hundred thousand dollars annually. The prize was first awarded in 2007, to
JoaquimChissano, the formerPresidentofMozambique. FestusMogaeofBotswanawon theprize in2008
(Auletta2011).
6Somescholarssuggestthattheseexplicitpactsbetweenelitessometimesfacilitatesuccessfultransitions
todemocracy,by sharing office and/ordistributing the rents of office (Burton,Gunther, andHigley 1992;
Karl1990).
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GeneralWojciechJaruzelskiofPolandgainedapostinthegovernment–Jaruzelskiconvened
talkstonegotiateatransitionprocess,andheldacompetitiveelectionin1989,whichpaved
thewaytowarddemocratization. Althoughheresignedfrompowerthen,Jaruzelskiheldthe
newly created post of president following the election.7 Regardless of title, a new post in
thegovernmentmayalsocomewith lifetime immunity fromprosecution. Though itturned
outtobeunsuccessful intheend,AugustoPinochetofChilewas initiallyprovided lifetime
tenure as a senator and thus immunity from any legal action by theChilean constitution
writtenbyhisregime.8
Explicit or implicit reassurancemaymotivate autocrats to hold a competitive election
because they will have a “safe exit” and retirement compared to if they tried to retain
powerotherwise. While implicitreassurance(i.e., legitimacy)andexplicitreassurance(e.g.,
constitutions) are distinct, the observable implications are the same: both can to a better
post-tenure fate foranautocrats. Thiscouldholdeven if it leadstoashortertenure forthe
autocrat. Accordingly, competitive elections are likely to result in better post-tenure fates
forautocrats.
This safeexitargument isespecially relevant in thecontemporary international system,
inwhichdictators arenotnecessarily “safe” internationally ordomestically after they lose
power. The international community is developing accepted mechanisms for holding au-
tocrats responsible for past human rights violations ormisdeeds against citizens, with the
creation of the InternationalCriminalCourt (ICC) and itspredecessors, the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR).Onceautocrats stepdown frompower, theymaybeprosecutedby inter-
7Hethensteppeddownafterone-term,andageneralelectionwasheldtochoosehissuccessor.Bycontrast,
NicolaeCeaus
,escuofRomaniawasGeneralSecretaryoftheRomanianCommunistPartyfrom1965to1989,
buthisregimesuddenlycollapsedduetoanti-governmentprotestsinDecember1989.Althoughhetriedtoflee
thecountry,hewaseventuallycapturedandexecuted.
8SeeAlbertusandMenaldo (2014) fordiscussionandanalysisof the roleofconstitutions indemocratic
transitions.
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nationalcourts forpasthumanrightsviolationsormisdeedsagainsttheircitizens.9
At the same time,political liberalizationby electionshasbecome amode of transition,
and elections are now considered the hallmark of democracy and promoted by the inter-
national community (Lindberg2006). Holdinga competitive electionmaynotonlyprotect
againstinternationalprosecution,butmayalsodeterinternationalactorsfrominterveningin
the state. Asdiscussedpreviously, the internationalcommunitymaybe reluctant to topple
autocratswhoholdcompetitiveelections,becausetheyhavemoreinternationalanddomestic
legitimacythanthosewhodonotholdcompetitiveelections,and interventionmightcreate
strongdisincentives forotherautocrats to implement elections. Basedon the same logic, I
expect the following to be true: thosewho hold competitive elections are less likely to be
removedby foreign forcesthanthosewhodonotholdsuchelections.
Here, it is importanttonotethattherearesomebroadconditionsunderwhichtheargu-
mentmaynotbeapplicable;inparticular,someautocratsmaynotneedtoholdcompetitive
electionsbecausetheyalreadyhavedecentpost-tenurefates.Forexample,iftheincumbents
areconfidentofnoviolentremoval,theymaynotholdcostlyandriskycompetitiveelections
to secure political survival after losing power. Since the established succession system can
lower the likelihood of violent exit of autocratic leaders (Escriba`-Folch 2013;Geddes et al.
2014),autocratsinsuchasystemmaynotholdcompetitiveelections.Escriba`-Folch(2013)in
particular argues that an established succession system facilitates post-tenure political
survival of autocrats, because it is possible for outgoing dictators to remain in the ruling
coalitioninsuchregimeswithinstitutionalizedproceduresforleadershipsuccession.Yet,even
in regimeswith an established succession system or in non-personalist regimes, this paper
arguesthatiftheincumbentleaderisnotsureabouthispost-tenurefate,hewillbebetteroff
holdingacompetitiveelectionbecauseitcangeneratebetterretirementoptions.
9Whereas the majority of prosecutions used to be domestic, international prosecutions have increased
overtime,andtheyoutnumbereddomestictrialsattheendof2000s(Escriba`-FolchandWright2012).
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Thus,Iexpectthatregardlessofregimetype,competitiveelectionsleadtobetterpost-tenure
fates for autocrats. For example,Kaunda ofZambia introduced a competitive election in
1991 inwhichhe lost to theoppositioncandidateChiluba. AlthoughZambiadidnothave
an established succession system at the time,Kaunda did not face dire outcomes such as
executionandexile.
Thisargumentspeaks to the literatureaboutwhyautocratsholdcompetitiveelections.
Competitiveelectionsmaynotbeafairgamble,andtheincumbentsmaywintheminmost
cases(Przeworski2015;Svolik2012),butweknowthatsomeincumbentautocratsdosuffer
electoral defeats (Huntington 1991; Kaminsky 1999; Schuler et al. 2013). Further, when
autocratswin,theytendtosufferfromlong-termdestabilizingeffectsofcompetitiveelections
suchasamobilizedopposition (e.g.,HowardandRoessler2006).Competitive electionsare
also costly, because once a competitive election is introduced, autocrats typically need to
increasethevote-buyingefforttosecurecoalitionmembers’loyalty,aswellastoreachother
supporters from expandedpoliticalbases.For example,Magaloni’s (2006)work onMexico
demonstratesthatelitesneedtomobilizesupportbydistributingpublicgoodssothatlower-
levelpoliticians remain loyal to theparty.10However,despite the risksandcostsassociated
withcompetitiveelections,autocratsholdcompetitiveelections.Iarguethatoneoverlooked
reason is that competitive elections increase the probability that autocrats can retire
peacefully.11
Insum,autocratscansecurebetterpost-tenurefatesbyholdingcompetitiveelections
10SimilartoMagaloni’spoint,BuenodeMesquitaetal.’s(2003)selectoratetheoryshowsthatinorderto
satisfyalargenumberofvoters,theincumbentshaveanincentivetoprovidemorepublicgoodsratherthan
privategoods.Asanextensionoftheargument,BuenodeMesquitaandSmith(2009)arguethatanincreasein
publicgoodsprovisionisparadoxicallydetrimentaltoincumbentsbecausetheprovisionofcorepublicgoods,
suchasfreedomofassembly,freepress,freespeech,andtransparentgovernment,facilitatestheorganizationof
theopposition.Thissuggeststhatevenaftersuccessfullydistributingenoughbenefitstosupportersand
winningtheelection,theleadermaystillsufferbecausethoseeffortscouldimpairhertenureoverthelong-term
byempoweringoppositiongroups(seealsoGallagherandHanson2013).
11Although thispaperdoesnot examine this empirically, theAppendixprovides further theoreticaldis-
cussion.
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becauseittendstoincreaselegitimacyorinvolveexplicitpactsforimmunity,relativetonot
holdingcompetitiveelections.Whilewedonothavedataforexplicitpactsanditisdifficult
tomeasurelegitimacy,iftheargumentiscorrect,weshouldobservethatholdingcompetitive
elections leads tobetterpost-tenure fates for autocrats. Further, the second implication is
thatcompetitiveelectionsare likelytoresult in less international interventionbecause it is
difficultfortheinternationalcommunitytotoppledictatorswhoholdacompetitiveelection,
anddoingsomightdeterotherautocrats fromdemocratizing. Thenextsectionteststhese
propositions.
3 EmpiricalStrategy
3.1 Methods
To examinewhether competitive elections increases the likelihood ofbetterpost-tenure
fates,Iemployamultinomiallogitmodel,whereIdistinguishbetweentheriskofsaferemoval
andviolent removal,comparingboth to the referencecategoryof staying inpower. To test
the implicationon international intervention, I furtherdivide theviolent removal category
into two: violent removaldrivenbydomestic forces andviolent removalby foreign forces.
Inotherwords, thepolychotomousdependentvariablemeasureswhetheranautocrat stays
in power, loses power safely, loses power violently by domestic forces, or loses power
violentlyby foreign forces.12
Estimating the effectof competitive elections is intrinsicallydifficultbecausewe cannot
observewhatwouldhavehappenedifaleaderdidnotholdacompetitiveelectionasopposed
toiftheleaderdoesholdone.Inotherwords,wecannotobservethesameleader’sbehavior
12With the samedataset, I conductananalysisofwhetherholdinga competitive election shortensauto-
crats’tenurelength,andIfindthatanautocratwhoholdsacompetitiveelectionhasashortertenurethanthe
counterpartwho does not hold such an election.This is consistentwithmy argument aswell as previous
studies(HowardandRoessler2006;Schuleretal.2013).
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bothwithandwithoutacompetitiveelection.Giventhisdifficulty,Icomparethepost-
tenurefatesof leaderswhoholdacompetitiveelectionwiththosewhodidnotholdsuchan
election.Furthermore,consideringthatobserveddifferencesinautocratscouldaccountfor
holding a competitive election (and therefore theirpost-tenure fates), I employ an entropy
balancingmethod tocontrol for imbalances incovariates (Hainmueller2012). Entropybal-
ancing re-weights covariates in the control group so that the treatment and control group
sharethesamemeanandvariance(andpossiblyskewness)inthecovariates. Then,entropy
balancingsearchesforthesetofweightsthatremainsascloseaspossibletouniformweights
(Hainmueller2012).13 In the followinganalyses, theweightsare selected so that thecontrol
group has the samemean and variance as the treatment group for all covariates.Then, I
estimatetheaveragetreatmenteffectofcompetitiveelectionswiththeweightsobtainedinthe
first step.Further, I also control for all the covariatesused in thefirst step to account for
unexplained variance in the dependent variable. Below, I report both the results of the
multinomiallogicanalyseswithandwithoutentropybalancing.
3.2 Data
ThedependentvariablescomefromtheArchigosdataset,whichcontains informationon
the post-tenure fate of dictators (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). Specifically, I
constructtwodependentvariablesbyrelyingonthedataset’s“exit”variable,whichdifferen-
tiatestypesofexitmodesinto“Regular,”“Irregular,”and“Foreign.”14Thefirstdependent
variablehas threecategories (i.e,0=“Stay inPower”;1=“RegularExit”;and2=“Irregular
13Inaddition,entropybalancing’ssingle-stepiterativeprocesstofindapropersetofbackgroundcharacter-
istics ismoreefficientthanpropensityscorematching’smanually iterativesearch forbalances incovariates.
Notethatentropybalancingdirectlycalculatesweightstobalancecovariatesinthecontrolgroupforknown
sampledistributions,whilepropensity scorematchingmethods indirectly estimate apropensity of a treat-
ment through a logistic or probit regression (Hainmueller and Xu 2013). Generally, entropy balancing is
consideredmoreeffectivethancommonpropensityscorematchingmethods,becauseitimprovesthebalance
acrossallcovariates.
14The variable has another category “Natural Death or Suicide,” and the current analysis treats the
categoryas“Regular”exit.
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Exit”),while the secondvariablehas four categories (i.e, 0=“Stay inPower”; 1=“Regular
Exit”;2=“Domestic-driven irregularExit”;and3=“Foreign-driven irregularExit”).15
The independentvariableof interest,CompetitiveElection, isdrawn from theNational
ElectionsAcrossDemocracy andAutocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde andMarinov 2012).
FollowingCederman,GleditschandHug (2013), Idefine electionsas competitivewhenop-
positionwasallowed(NELDA3),morethanonepartywaslegal(NELDA4),andtherewas
achoiceofcandidatesontheballot(NELDA5). Icodethevariable1 ifallthreeconditions
aremet,and0otherwise. Ionlyconsidernational-levelelections(i.e.,presidentialorparlia-
mentaryor constituentassembly elections)and the timeperiod ranges from1960 to2004,
whentheNELDAandArchigosdatasetsoverlap.
Tominimizeconcernsthatomittedvariablescouldbiastheresults,Iincludeasetofcon-
trolvariablesassociatedwithdictators’post-electionfates.First,Iaccountforthedifferent
typesofdictatorshipdefinedbyGeddesetal.(2014).Thesecategoriesincludemonarchies,
military regimes, one-party, and personalist regimes.16 Second, for economic covariates, I
relyonthePennWorldTablesv6.3and includethe logarithmofthe3-yearmovingaverage
ofacountry’spercapitaGDP(3yrMeanln(GDPpercapita))andthe3-yearmovingaverage
ofitspopulation(3yrMean ln(Population)). Further,Iaccountforpoliticalconditionsthat
autocrats face by including the 3-yearmoving average of polity scores (3yrMeanPolity),
ethnic fractionalization data (Ethnic Fractionalization) (Fearon 2003), and human rights
violations (AdjustedHRViolations). Asprevious studiesargue, ethnic fractionalizationor
15WhileIusethe“exit”variableasaproxyforpost-tenurefatesofautocraticleaders,theArchigosdataset
hasanothervariablecalledPostTenureFatewhichmaybeamoredirectproxy.However,whenthevariableis
recoded into the currentanalysis’ time-series format, thevariablebecomesan identicalvariableas the exit
variable(Chi-square=1717.399,p<0.001)exceptonevalue(i.e.,-999intheposttenurefatevariable,whichis
amissingvaluebecauseleaderslostofficeintheyearwhenthedatacollectionendedandtheycouldnottrack
their fates).Thismeans that thosewhohave thevalueof“Irregular” exitalmostalwayhaveviolentpost-
tenurefatessuchasexile,prosecutionorexecutioninthepost-tenurefatevariable,whilethosewhohavethe
valueof“Regular”exitalmostalwayshavenon-violentpost-tenurefatesinthepost-tenurefatevariable.
16Asarobustnesscheck,IalsotestotherspecificationsbyusingHadeniusandTeorell(2007)’sregimetype
variable,butIfindthattheresultsarelargelysimilar(notreported).
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polarizationmayaffecteconomicperformanceofautocratsandtheriskofcivilconflicts,
therebyinfluencingpost-tenurefatesofautocrats(Horowitz1985;MontalvoandReynal-
Querol (2005). Human rights violations are included to indirectly control for autocrats’
popularity – those who have better human rights records should have better post-tenure
fates. Iusetheadjusted, latenthumanrightsvariablesestimatedbyFariss(2014).
TocontrolforwhethercompetitiveelectionstakeplaceintheColdWarorpost-ColdWar
period,Icode1iftheelectionisafter1990,and0otherwise(ColdWar).Thevariableisalso
expectedtocaptureapossibleenhancedrelationshipbetween foreignaidanddemocratiza-
tionaftertheColdWar(Dunning2004;MarinovandGoemans2013;Wright2009). Allthe
modelsalsoincludeavariableindicatingwhetheracountryholdsanon-competitiveelection
(Non-competitive Election). I also include two dictator-level variables: dictators’ age
(Age), and how they take power (Entry Mode). To control for time dependence, I
include three cubic splines and another variable measuring elapsed time since the
occurrence of event,suggestedbyBeck,Katz,andTucker(1998).17
Table 1 reports summary statistics, andFigureA inAppendix compares themeans in
thetreatmentandcontrolgroup(beforeandafterentropybalancing). Afterthere-weighting
basedonentropybalancing,themeans inthecontrolgrouparebalancedwiththemeans in
thetreatmentgroup.
[Table1abouthere]
17Theuseoftimedummiestocontrolfortimedependencemayraiseaproblemofinefficiency(Beck,Katz,
andTucker1998;CarterandSignorino2010).Instead,splinesdonotleadtoinefficiencynordataseparation,
and allow us to smooth the relationship between the dependent variable and time by creating a smooth
functionoftime.Finally,followingpreviousstudies(Brownlee2009;HowardandRoessler2006;Przeworskiet
al.(1999),IdropdemocraciesfromtheanalysisusingCheibubetal.(2010).
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4 EmpiricalAnalyses
First,abivariateanalysis suggests that thosewhoholdcompetitiveelectionshave safer
post-tenure fates than their counterpartswho do not hold competitive elections. Between
1946 and 2004, 63.5% of autocrats who hold competitive elections have safe retirements,
while39.7%of thosewhodonothold competitive electionshave the same safe retirements
andtheresthavehighriskexit.18
I now considermultivariate analyses.Table 2 provides results forwhether competitive
electionsleadtoabetterpost-tenurefatefortheincumbent.Model1considersthetrichoto-
mousdependentvariable,whileModel2addsa foreign interventionoutcome to thedepen-
dent variable. The multinomial logit analyses find that the Competitive Election variable
leads to“Regular”exit (i.e., thefirstcolumnsof themodels),while theyarenotassociated
with“Irregular”exit (i.e., the secondcolumnof themodel).Since it isdifficult to interpret
multinomial logitcoefficientsdirectly,and the significanceofcoefficientswilldependon the
outcomescompared, Icalculate the implied substantive results. In termsofpredictedprob-
abilities,accordingtoModel1ofTable2,holdingacompetitiveelectionresults inaroughly
35%increaseintheprobabilityofaregularexit.
[Table2abouthere]
Model2teststhelikelihoodofforeigninterventionacrossautocratswhoholdcompetitive
electionsand thosewhodonot. Iexpect thatholdingacompetitiveelectionmakes itmore
difficult for international actors to intervene in domestic politics.Again, the analysis finds
that competitive elections tend to result in autocrats’ safe exit. In substantive terms,
according toModel4,holdinga competitive election results ina roughly35% increase ina
regularexit,whereasthelikelihoodofforeign-drivenviolentremovalisalmostzerorightafter
acompetitiveelection.Overall,theresultsareconsistentwithmyargumentthatholdinga
18The difference is statistically significant (Chi-square=14.61, p<0.01).
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competitiveelectionresults inan increase inthe likelihoodofaregularexitandadecrease
inthe likelihoodof foreign intervention.
Moving to analyses using entropy balancing to address the selection problem, Table 3
presentstheresults.Consistentwiththepreviousmodels,Ifindthatregardlessofthemodel,
competitiveelectionshaveasignificant,negativeeffectonpost-tenurefates,whichmeansthat
competitive elections are more likely to result in dictators’ safe exits. With regard to
substantive terms, competitive elections increase the likelihood of autocrats’ safe exit by
about34%.Here,itisimportanttonotethatentropybalancingonlyadjustsimbalancesinthe
covariatesbasedonobservables,andthusthereremainsaconcernaboutapossiblebiasdueto
unobservables.However,giventhedifficultyofapplyingexperimentalmethodsinthecurrent
study,theentropybalancingmethodisthebestavailabletoimproveourunderstandingabout
theeffectofcompetitiveelectionsonautocrats’post-tenurefates.
[Table3abouthere]
Further, I considerdifferential effects of competitive elections onpost-tenure fateswith
truncated samplesby regime type.Escriba`-Folch (2013)finds that autocrats inpersonalist
regimesarelesslikelytohaveregularexits.WhileTable2showsthatautocratsinpersonalist
regimesinfacttendnottohaveregularexits,Table3reportsthateveninpersonalistregimes,
autocrats can increase their chance of safe exit, if they hold competitive elections. This
electioneffectholdsevenforotherregimetypes–autocratsinone-partyregimesandmilitary
regimes are more likely to have safe exits once they hold competitive elections. Yet, it is
importanttonotethatmilitaryregimeshavelargestandarderrors.Thissuggeststhatthereis
morevariation intheeffectofcompetitiveelectionsonpost-tenurefates inmilitaryregimes,
andotherfactorsshouldexplaintheunaccountedvariation.Understandingthewithin-regime
variationisanareaforfutureresearch.19
19Theonlyregimetypethatdoesnotshowastatisticalsignificanceismonarchy.However,partlybecause
monarchygenerallydonotholdcompetitiveelections,theanalysesdidnotconverge.
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5 Conclusion
What happens to dictators who hold competitive elections? I argue that competitive
elections allow autocrats to retire safely. The statistical analyses provided evidence that
autocratsarelesslikelytofaceviolentremovalaftercompetitiveelections,andthuspolitical
survival of autocrats after such elections is relatively well assured. As a result, even if
competitiveelectionshaveadestabilizingeffectontheregime,andsomedictatorsmayhave
to stepdown shortlyafterholdingacompetitiveelection, itmay stillpayoff to implement
elections.
Thefindings indicate that reassuranceaboutapost-tenure fateafteracompetitiveelec-
tion could affect autocrats’ decisions to introduce competitive elections. Previous studies
arguethatadictatorhasnochoicebuttoholdacompetitiveelectionwhenathreatofouster
becomes imminent (e.g.,Geddes 2006).Yet, if adictator is assured thathe can stepdown
safelyafteracompetitiveelection,heshouldhaveanincentivetoholdsuchanelec-tionbefore
thethreatbecomes imminent.However,thisraisesanewdilemma:providingreassuranceto
autocratsmayresult inpoliticaldevelopment,butatthecostof immunitytotheautocrats
despitetheirpasthumanrightsviolations.Thisisadifficultchoiceforhumanrightsactivists
andjuristswhowanttoprosecutedictatorswhohaveviolatedhumanrightsinthepast.But
providingreassurancemaybethelesseroftwoevilsifitencouragestheautocrattoexitand
relinquish power. Future research could explore a comparison of dictators with explicit
reassurances and those without to shed light on the trade-offs between justice and
liberalization.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Max Min
Trichotomous Post-tenure Fates 0.184 0.519 2.00 0.00
Polychotomous Post-tenure Fates 0.188 0.534 3.00 0.00
Competitive Election 0.131 0.337 1.00 0.00
One-party 0.463 0.499 1.00 0.00
Military 0.116 0.320 1.00 0.00
Monarchy 0.121 0.326 1.00 0.00
Personalist 0.215 0.411 1.00 0.00
Adjusted HR Violations -0.401 0.950 2.25 -3.13
Age 55.091 12.274 92.00 17.00
Entry Mode 0.405 0.538 0.00 2.00
Non-competitive Election 0.096 0.294 1.00 0.00
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.511 0.266 0.95 0.00
3yr Mean Polity -4.931 4.600 10.00 -10.00
3yr Mean ln(Population) 8.650 1.496 14.07 4.66
3yr Mean ln(GDP per capita) 7.961 1.005 11.48 5.05
Cold War 0.236 0.424 1.00 0.00
Spline1 -291.239 539.031 0.00 -4278
Spline2 -1092.577 2252.739 0.00 -18690
Spline3 -1565.890 3667.340 0.00 -32868
Time in Office 7.588 8.150 47.00 0.00
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Table 2: Multinomial Logit Model: Impact of Competitive Election on Post-tenure Fates
VARIABLES
(1) (2)
Regular vs. Irregular Exit Regular vs. Irregular vs. Foreign Exit
Competitive election 1.329*** 0.386 1.332*** 0.415 -28.339***
(0.227) (0.261) (0.227) (0.264) (0.677)
One-party -0.825** -0.497 -0.827** -0.467 15.333***
(0.342) (0.312) (0.342) (0.315) (5.023)
Military -0.197 1.009*** -0.200 1.006*** 18.170***
(0.416) (0.345) (0.415) (0.348) (4.804)
Personalist -1.459*** 0.247 -1.460*** 0.262 16.559***
(0.447) (0.333) (0.446) (0.339) (5.086)
Monarchy -0.490 -0.197 -0.491 -0.307 16.798***
(0.561) (0.578) (0.560) (0.608) (4.569)
Adjusted HR violations -0.070 -0.259** -0.066 -0.233** -1.438
(0.117) (0.104) (0.117) (0.108) (1.189)
Age 0.051*** 0.021** 0.051*** 0.020** 0.038
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.028)
Entry Mode -0.142 -0.097 -0.141 -0.098 -0.108
(0.213) (0.189) (0.213) (0.193) (0.554)
Non-competitive election 1.095*** 0.002 1.096*** -0.057 0.957
(0.274) (0.354) (0.274) (0.365) (1.177)
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.002 -0.095 -0.001 -0.119 1.602
(0.348) (0.352) (0.348) (0.352) (3.148)
3yr Mean Polity 0.006 0.040* 0.006 0.043* -0.230
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.201)
3yr Mean ln(Population) -0.010 -0.202** -0.007 -0.176** -1.327**
(0.084) (0.080) (0.084) (0.081) (0.519)
3yr Mean ln(GDP per capita) -0.040 -0.500*** -0.041 -0.523*** -0.133
(0.126) (0.118) (0.126) (0.118) (0.659)
Cold War -0.171 -0.835*** -0.174 -0.852*** 0.214
(0.211) (0.255) (0.211) (0.258) (1.522)
Spline1 -0.124*** -0.260*** -0.125*** -0.261*** 0.150
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.377)
Spline2 0.029*** 0.061*** 0.030*** 0.061*** -0.026
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.091)
Spline3 -0.002** -0.004*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Time in Office -1.230*** -2.484*** -1.239*** -2.499*** 2.049
(0.290) (0.307) (0.290) (0.309) (3.312)
Constant -2.986** 5.396*** -2.980** 5.426*** -20.556
(1.278) (1.077) (1.278) (1.073) (0.000)
Observations 2,856 2,856
Log Likelihood -1001.4 -1015.2
Standard errors in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 3: Matching Analyses: Effect of Competitive Election on Post-tenure Fates
Baseline One-party Military Personalist
Regular Exit
1.238*** 1.120*** 1.574* 1.329**
(0.242) (0.398) (0.879) (0.658)
Observations 2856 1356 322 760
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. **<0.05; ***<0.01. All the covariates for the balancing stage are
included, although omitting the covariates from the analyses do not change the main findings.
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Appendix
Entropy Balancing
This figure provides the standardized differences in the means before and after the entropy
balancing. The figure shows that all the covariates are balanced between treated and control
samples after the entropy balancing.
Figure A: Entropy Balancing
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Reassurance and Competitive Elections
This paper suggests that although dictators’ tenure may shorten after a competitive
election, the election can provide assurance for dictators that they will have a safe exit from
tenure. This Appendix builds on this argument to systematically examine if reassurance
about a post-tenure fate affects autocrats’ decisions to introduce competitive elections. More
specifically, by using simple models, I demonstrate that autocrats with safe exit are likely to
hold a competitive election earlier than the counterparts without.
5.1 Competitive Election without Reassurance
To see how reassurance after competitive election matters, I formalize an election game
between an incumbent dictator and democratic force. First, I simplify the previous studies’
argument that a dictator has no choice but to hold a competitive election in the following
manner (e.g., Geddes 2006). Suppose a situation in which the balance of power between a
dictator and democratic force will become tilted toward the democratic force in the future.
The democratic force is represented by a domestic opposition group and citizens, and backed
by international actors. Given the situation, the game begins with the incumbent’s decision of
whether to hold a competitive election, ADictator = {Election,∼ Election}. If the incumbent
decides to hold the election, he has to step down and may be eventually prosecuted due to
past human rights violations. Conversely, if he does not hold the election, the democratic
force has to decide whether to revolt against the dictator, ADemocratic Force = {Revolt,∼
Revolt}. If it revolts against the dictator, he wins with probability p or loses with probability
1− p, ANature = {DWin,D Lose}. Figure B shows the sequence of the game.
I name each outcome Democratization (Election), Repression (∼ Election,Revolt,D Win),
Execution (∼ Election,Revolt,D Lose), and Status Quo (∼ Election,∼ Revolt). For sim-
plicity, suppose that the payoff ordering for a dictator is: StatusQuo ≻ Repression ≻
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Democratization ≻ Execution. The payoff ordering for the democratic force is: Democratization ≻
Execution ≻ Status Quo ≻ Repression. Using backward induction, the value of p shapes
the expected payoff associated with a decision for the democratic force to revolt against
the dictator. First, consider a situation in which the dictator’s probability of winning a
revolt is high such that the expected payoff for the democratic force in the lower subgame is:
E(Status Quo) ≻ E(Repression, Execution). In this case, the democratic force will always
choose ∼ Revolt over Revolt. Since the payoff for Status Quo is greater than the payoff for
Democratization for the dictator, he will not hold an election. The equilibrium for this case
is thus: {∼ Election,∼ Revolt} and democratization will not emerge. In contrast, if the
probability for the dictator to win the conflict is low such that the expected payoff for the
democratic force is: E(Repression,Execution) ≻ E(Status Quo), the democratic force will
always choose to revolt against the dictator. In this case, the dictator must decide whether
to hold a competitive election. Since the payoff for Democratization is greater than the
expected payoff for Repression and Execution for the dictator, he will agree to hold an
election and the outcome Democratization will materialize. From this, in this game, we can
see that democratization will emerge when the revolutionary threat from democratic force
is high (p is low). In other words, if the revolutionary threat is credible enough, a dictator
chooses to democratize the country.
5.2 Competitive Election with Reassurance
I next incorporate the possibility for a dictator to stay in power after competitive elec-
tions – I call this possibility reassurance. In this game, if a dictator decides to hold
a multiparty election, the democratic force has to decide whether it reassures the dic-
tator that he can have immunity from prosecution and/or execution after the election,
ADemocratic Force = {Reassurance,∼ Reassurance}. As with the empirical analysis, I assume
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that reassurance is only granted on condition of holding a competitive election. Figure C
shows the game. The payoff ordering for a dictator is assumed as follows: LiberalDictator ≻
Status Quo ≻ Repression ≻ Democratization ≻ Execution, where Liberal Dictator is the
outcome in which the dictator becomes a guardian of democracy in the country after holding
a competitive election. The payoff ordering LiberalDictator ≻ StatusQuo is justified, since
the balance of power between a dictator and democratic force will become tilted toward the
democratic force in the future – the dictator is better off introducing a competitive election
now and stepping down as a guardian of democracy than retaining the status quo and de-
mocratizing in the future when the balance of power is already against the dictator.
In this game, the outcome Liberal Dictator will emerge when the democratic force offers
reassurance to the dictator that he will have immunity after the election.20 If reassurance
is ensured, the equilibrium is achieved independently of the lower-right subgame: the rev-
olutionary threat does not have to be credible. On the other hand, if the democratic force
does not give the dictator reassurance after democratization, the dictator will not agree to
hold an election and a different equilibrium will emerge depending on p.21 In this case, the
dictator agrees to democratize only if the revolutionary threat becomes credible.
In a nutshell, from the two different games – one without reassurance and the other
with reassurance – one can see that autocrats introduce a competitive election even without
a serious threat against the regime when the following conditions are met: (1) a dictator
is assured that he can step down safely after a competitive election, and (2) the dictator
expects that their strength will be weakened in the future. By using the simple models, this
Appendix showed that autocrats with reassurance would introduce a competitive election at a
20In other words, the dictator holds an election when the payoff ordering for democratic force is:
Liberal Dictator ≻ Democratization ≻ Execution ≻ Status Quo ≻ Repression.
21The payoff ordering for democratic force is assumed: Democratization ≻ Execution ≻
Liberal Dictator ≻ Status Quo ≻ Repression.
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relatively early stage of transition process, whereas counterparts without reassurance resist
democratization demands until a revolutionary threat becomes credible. This eventually
suggests the following reassurance dilemma: providing reassurance to autocrats may result
in political development, but, on the other hand, immunity or a safe post-tenure fate has to
be provided to the autocrats despite their past human rights violations.
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Figure B: Game without Rassurance
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Figure C: Game with Rassurance
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